HIV Transmission Among Male Inmates in a State Prison SystemGeorgia, 1992-2005
The estimated prevalence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection is nearly five times higher for incarcerated populations (2.0%) (1) than for the general U.S. population (0.43%) (2) . In 1988, the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC) initiated mandatory HIV testing of inmates upon entry into prison and voluntary HIV testing of inmates on request or if clinically indicated. GDC offered voluntary HIV testing to inmates annually during July 2003-June 2005 and currently offers testing to inmates on request. During July 1988-February 2005, a total of 88 male inmates were known to have had both a negative HIV test result upon entry into prison and a subsequent confirmed positive HIV test result (i.e., seroconversion) during incarceration. Of these 88 inmates, 37 (42%) had had more than one negative HIV test result before their HIV diagnosis. In October 2004, GDC and the Georgia Division of Public Health invited CDC to assist with an epidemiologic investigation of HIV risk behaviors and transmission patterns among male inmates within GDC facilities and to make HIV prevention recommendations for the prison population. This report describes the results of that investigation, which identified the following characteristics as associated with HIV seroconversion in prison: male-male sex in prison, tattooing in prison, older age (i.e., age of >26 years at date of interview), having served >5 years of the current sentence, black race, and having a body mass index (BMI) of <25.4 kg/m 2 on entry into prison. Findings from the investigation demonstrated that risk behaviors such as male-male sex and tattooing were associated with HIV transmission among inmates, highlighting the need for HIV prevention programs for this population.
To describe the state's male inmate population and the 88 inmates known to have become HIV positive while in prison (i.e., seroconverters), investigators analyzed summary demographic data for all inmates and prison-movement and HIVtesting histories of seroconverters, all of which had been routinely collected for GDC administrative purposes. The HIVtesting and prison-movement histories of seroconverters were also analyzed to identify the facility in which HIV transmission occurred, defined as one in which a seroconverter had a negative HIV test followed by a subsequent positive HIV test confirmed by Western blot while incarcerated in the same facility.
To identify demographic characteristics and behavioral risk factors associated with HIV seroconversion, both an unmatched and a matched case-control study were conducted. Male inmates aged >18 years were eligible to participate in both studies. Case inmates had documented HIV seroconversion during the incarceration period. Control inmates had a negative result on their most recent HIV test (during 1997-2005 ) and had their HIV-negative status confirmed by repeat HIV testing on enrollment in the investigation. For the unmatched study, control inmates were randomly selected from a list of eligible inmates in the seven prisons in which the largest proportion of seroconverters were believed to have become infected with HIV. For the matched casecontrol study, to compare inmates with the same duration of exposure to risk for HIV transmission, control inmates were selected from the 31 prisons currently housing the case inmates and matched by sentence length (±2 years) and time already served (±2 years). After giving written, informed consent, inmates completed audio computer-assisted selfinterviews (ACASI). No personally identifying information was collected in these interviews. To determine how behavioral risks for HIV infection changed during incarceration, the interview asked about sex, drug use, and tattooing behaviors during the 6 months before incarceration and during the incarceration period. Questions were also asked about knowledge regarding HIV transmission. Exact multivariate logistic regression was used to analyze unmatched data, and exact multivariate conditional logistic regression was used to analyze matched-pair data. After ACASI, investigators asked openended questions about strategies to reduce HIV transmission among inmates.
In October 2005, GDC housed 44,990 male inmates in 73 facilities; median age was 34 years (range: 15-88 years). A total of 28,350 (63%) were black, 16,364 (36%) were white, 50 were American Indian (0.1%), and 47 (0.1%) were Asian; race was not reported for 179 (0.4%). A total of 856 (1.9%) were known to be HIV infected, of whom 780 (91%) were infected before incarceration, and 732 (86%) were black.* During July 1988-February 2005 (the month in which the last seroconverter included in the investigation was identified), 88 male inmates had both a negative HIV test result upon entry into prison and a subsequent HIV seroconversion during incarceration. Of these 88 inmates, the median age at time of HIV diagnosis was 32 years (range: 21-58 years). Fiftynine (67%) were black, and 29 (33%) were white. Diagnoses were made during September 1992-June 2003 for 47 (53%) inmates and during July 2003-February 2005 for 41 (47%). For 26 (30%) of the 88 seroconverters, the facility in which HIV transmission occurred was identified; for 34 (39%) seroconverters, the facility in which transmission occurred was narrowed to two. Of the 88 seroconverters, 11 were released from prison and two died before the start of the case-control study. Of the remaining 75 inmates, 68 (91%) were enrolled in both the unmatched and matched case-control studies as case inmates. Sixty-five (87%) unmatched control inmates and 70 (79%) matched control inmates who were eligible agreed to participate.
In multivariate analysis of the unmatched study, variables significantly associated with HIV seroconversion were malemale sex in prison, older age, having served >5 years of the current sentence, and having a BMI of <25.4 kg/m 2 on entry into prison.
Univariate analysis of matched case-control study data identified multiple demographic characteristics and risk behaviors as significantly associated with HIV seroconversion (Table 1) . However, in the final multivariate logistic regression model, only four covariates were significantly associated with HIV seroconversion during incarceration: male-male sex in prison, receipt of a tattoo in prison, BMI of <25.4 kg/m 2 on entry into prison, and black race ( Table 2) .
Among 54 inmates (45 case and nine control) reporting male-male sex while in prison, 35 (78%) of 45 case inmates and four (44%) of nine control inmates reported no malemale sex during the 6 months immediately before incarceration. Among 54 inmates (case and control) who reported any male-male sex during incarceration, 39 (72%) reported consensual sex and 48 (89%) reported sex with other inmates. Exchange sex (e.g., for money, food, or cigarettes) and rape were also reported. Of 43 inmates (34 case and nine control) who reported any consensual sex, 13 (30%) reported using condoms or other improvised barrier methods (e.g., rubber gloves or plastic wrap). Of 14 (12 case and two control) inmates who reported any exchange sex, three (21%) reported using improvised barrier methods but not condoms; no barrier methods were used during rape. Of 59 inmates (48 case and 11 control) who reported having sex in prison, 36 (75%) case inmates and six (55%) control inmates reported intent to tell sex partners outside prison about unprotected sex in prison.
Of 68 inmates who reported receiving a tattoo in prison, 59 (87%) used clean tattooing equipment for at least one tattoo, 52 (76%) used bleach to clean tattooing equipment, two (3%) used tattooing equipment that was not cleaned, and seven (10%) did not know whether tattooing equipment was cleaned before they received at least one tattoo. Most inmates correctly identified that HIV can be transmitted through unprotected sex (88%), needle sharing (83%), and infected blood (78%). In 181 responses to open-ended questions about how to reduce HIV transmission in prison, inmates suggested that condoms be made available in prison (38%), that inmates receive HIV education (22%), and that inmates practice safe tattooing (13%).
Editorial Note: This report indicates that HIV transmission among inmates in Georgia's prison system was associated with male-male sex and tattooing and highlights the need for more effective HIV prevention among inmates. Sex among inmates occurs (4), and laws or policies prohibiting sex among inmates have been difficult to implement or enforce. However, GDC might consider certain HIV prevention options (e.g., education, testing, and prevention counseling) proven to be effective for nonincarcerated populations; some of those prevention measures are being used in correctional settings within and outside the United States (4).
CDC recommends that HIV education, testing, and prevention counseling be made available to populations at increased behavioral or clinical risk for HIV infection, including inmates in correctional facilities (5, 6) . HIV prevention education in state prisons should address male-male sex, tattooing, and injection drug use that occurs during incarceration and risk behaviors that occur after release. Case studies of inmate-led HIV prevention interventions suggest that these interventions might engender more inmate trust of and cooperation with intervention staff (4) . HIV education might also benefit correctional facility staff.
CDC recommends that HIV screening be provided upon entry into prison and before release and that voluntary HIV testing be offered periodically during incarceration. This investigation demonstrates that annual voluntary testing is useful; 41 (47%) of 88 HIV seroconverters were identified during the 2 years in which annual testing was offered. Prison HIV testing programs allow inmates to learn their HIV status and, if not infected, to learn protective behaviors to reduce their HIV infection risks (7) . Inmates who test HIV positive should receive antiretroviral treatment and care in addition to prevention counseling to protect future sex partners; before release, they should receive discharge planning and linkages to care in the community. GDC provides treatment and care for HIV-infected inmates, provides a 30-day supply of antiretroviral drugs on release and, in 12 of 73 facilities, undertakes enhanced HIV discharge planning, which includes individualized case management, housing placement, substance abuse and mental health treatment referrals, enrollment in benefit programs, and referrals for assistance with employment and other social services.
Approximately 15% of inmates reported using improvised barrier protection methods during sex, and 38% recommended making condoms available in prisons. Providing condoms to sexually active persons is an integral part of HIV prevention interventions outside prisons. However, in most prison and jail settings, condoms are considered contraband (4) . Condoms are provided to some inmates in state prisons in Mississippi and Vermont and jails in Los Angeles, New York, Philadel- phia, San Francisco, and the District of Columbia (4) . A recent survey in a large jail in a U.S. city reported that condom distribution was acceptable to most inmates and correctional officers (8) . Departments of corrections with existing condom distribution programs should evaluate those programs to determine their effectiveness; departments of corrections without condom distribution programs should assess relevant state laws, policies, and circumstances to determine the feasibility and benefits and risks of implementing such programs. Although no case of HIV transmission via tattooing has been documented, the procedure carries a theoretical risk for transmission if nonsterile equipment is used. In this investigation, receipt of a tattoo was associated with HIV seroconversion. Further investigation is required to explore commonalities in time frames, tattoo artists, or equipment among HIVinfected inmates who reported tattooing as their only risk behavior and to determine whether the association between tattooing and HIV seroconversion identified in this investigation is causal.
Black race was significantly associated with HIV seroconversion, although no differences in risk behaviors were identified among racial groups. HIV disproportionately affects blacks in the general population, and 86% of males who were already infected with HIV when they entered GDC facilities were black. Black-only sex or tattooing networks might exist in prisons, given that 63% of all male inmates and 86% of HIV-infected men in GDC facilities are black. If so, then black race might be a marker in the analysis for the choice of sex or tattooing partners within these networks. Having a BMI of <25.4 kg/m 2 also was significantly associated with HIV seroconversion, but the implications of this finding for HIV transmission and prevention are unclear. Although BMI was explored in the analysis as a physical characteristic associated with HIV seroconversion, insufficient data are available to determine whether a statistically significant association existed between lower BMI and reported rape.
The findings in this report are subject to at least three limitations. First, risk behaviors might differ between seroconverters identified through voluntary HIV testing and those refusing voluntary HIV testing, limiting representativeness. Second, recall bias might have affected the reporting of HIV risk behaviors. Finally, although ACASI interviews were conducted to provide privacy and reduce social desirability bias, inmates might have inaccurately reported HIV risk behaviors because sex between inmates, sex with correctional staff, injection drug use, and tattooing are illegal or forbidden by policy in this prison system.
In response to this investigation, GDC is evaluating options to modify existing HIV prevention education and house HIV-infected inmates in a limited number of facilities. Three state prison systems (Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina) house HIV-infected inmates in separate facilities to provide focused medical care. At least three other state prison systems (California, Florida, and Texas) house some HIVinfected inmates with advanced disease or those requesting separate housing in "centers of excellence" for medical care; HIV-negative and HIV-infected inmates mix for education, vocational training, religious, and other prison programs. However, separate housing of HIV-infected inmates is limited in that it 1) does not reduce the spread of other sexually transmitted, opportunistic, and bloodborne infections, 2) might increase the risk for tuberculosis outbreaks (9), 3) raises concerns about disclosure of inmates' HIV status and access to prison programs, and 4) does not prevent transmission by inmates who are unaware that they are infected or by HIVinfected corrections staff. No data are available on the effectiveness of separate housing for HIV-infected inmates as an HIV prevention strategy.
Although this investigation was conducted in a single state prison system, incarcerated populations in other correctional settings are at risk for HIV infection, both while in prison and after release into the community. Corrections officials, in partnership with public health officials, should assess the adequacy of existing programs and services for incarcerated populations and develop strategies to reduce HIV infection, both in prisons and in the community. This recommendation is consistent with one recently issued by the Presidential Advisory Council on HIV/ AIDS, which called for improved HIV prevention in U.S. prisons, jails, and correctional facilities (10). In October 2005, FPICN detected an increase in exposures to hydrocarbon fuels after Hurricane Wilma, when prolonged widespread power outages were accompanied by a gasoline shortage (Figure 2) . In September 2004, FPICN detected an increase in exposure to hydrocarbon fuels in the days before and after Hurricane Frances made landfall. Of 24 exposures to hydrocarbon fuels reported the day after landfall, 12 (50%) were directly related to persons siphoning gasoline, and three of those 12 exposures occurred while persons were siphoning gasoline for portable generators. In both 2004 and 2005, the number of incidents involving other analyzed exposures (e.g., batteries, fire/matches/explosives, or bites/ stings) after hurricanes did not differ substantially from baseline exposure data.
During the 2005 hurricane season, beginning the day after hurricane landfall and continuing for 3-10 days, daily graphs illustrating the frequency of exposures to harmful substances were posted on EpiCom, the secure information-sharing Internet site maintained by FDOH, and on the Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X), the secure communications system for public health officials maintained by CDC. The graphs were also distributed to the Planning Section of the FDOH Incident Management Team. County officials used the information to foster awareness of possible health hazards before, during, and after landfall of each hurricane in 2005. Information about CO and hydrocarbon fuel exposures was used to alert the public to the hazards of improper use of portable, gasoline-powered generators. Public health announcements also described how to disinfect water for consumption and prevent foodborne illness by practicing safe food handling and spoiled food disposal. 
Source of exposure
Improper storage, ventilation, and maintenance of generators.
Gasoline siphoning for fuel and use of oilbased lamps for alternative light sources.
Use of alternative power sources for lighting and electronics that result in dermal injuries.
Environmental exposure during power outages and property restoration.
Sewage overflows and spills resulting from sewer lift stations knocked out by storm surges, excessive rainfall, and power outages.
Inadequate food refrigeration and storage; undercooked food products. tion to health hazards related to hurricanes. Use of on-line, real-time FPICN data enabled timely detection of increases in injury and illness events before, during, and after hurricanes, enhancing FDOH capacity for delivering important public health and safety measures. These capabilities potentially reduced morbidity and mortality in Florida from these events. This local monitoring activity is similar to the national Toxic Exposure Surveillance System (TESS), which is used by AAPCC and CDC to detect potential public health threats from reports received by 61 poison control centers in the United States. TESS has demonstrated its capability to provide surveillance to states and regions and to detect potential poisonings and biologic or chemical events (6) (7) (8) . However, in Florida, although the data used for TESS surveillance is maintained by FPICN, the subset of data transferred to TESS contains no personal identifiers, case notes, or data specific to the state's own monitoring system. To aid in detecting health hazards immediately before and after hurricanes, FDOH continues to use various statewide surveillance tools (e.g., hospital-based data, emergency medical services reports, and shelter surveillance). Hospital-based surveillance relies on chief complaints, disease and injury codes, and discharge data (9, 10) . However, in the aftermath of hurricanes, hospitals can experience structural damage, electric power loss, limitations in available personnel, or other factors that make routine functioning and surveillance difficult. In 2004, FPICN received telephone calls during four hurricanes from residents in their homes who were told by 911 emergency operators not to go to health-care facilities because travel was too hazardous. After these hurricanes, FPICN received reports and inquiries from residents because travel was impaired, the nearby hospital was damaged, or wait times at the hospitals were excessive. Therefore, monitoring of local poison control center data provided a valuable supplement to the hospital-based surveillance system.
The findings in this report are subject to at least two limitations. First, underreporting to poison control centers (e.g., because of telephone service disruption) might have occurred. Second, delays might have occurred between exposures to a harmful substance and recognition by a person that their illness was related to that exposure (e.g., headache resulting from CO exposure).
During 2005, FDOH monitoring of FPICN data enabled timely detection of increases in CO and hydrocarbon fuel exposures before, during, and after hurricanes. Public health departments might consider collaborating with local or regional poison control centers to monitor for exposures after disasters. Evaluation of local and national poison center systems for detecting outbreaks of diseases and increases in injuries or poisonings should be an ongoing process to substantiate methods for collection, analysis, and decision-making based on these data. On October 24, 2005, Hurricane Wilma, the most intense hurricane (882 mb) ever recorded in the Atlantic Basin, made landfall on the southern tip of Florida (1) . By landfall, Wilma had been downgraded from a Category 5 (i.e., winds of >156 mph) to a Category 3 hurricane but still contained winds of >110 mph. The storm moved slowly over the Florida Keys and south Florida, causing extensive wind and flood damage to homes and businesses. Approximately 3 million households were left without power, and thousands of residents were displaced to temporary shelters; 10 deaths were storm related (2). On October 27, the Florida Department of Health (FDOH) asked CDC and the North Carolina Division of Public Health (NCDPH) for assistance in performing a rapid needs assessment of communities most affected by the storm. On the basis of information from local public health officials, field assessment teams, and electric power companies, FDOH identified Hendry County, a rural county with a 2000 population of 36,210, as the most severely affected area. Two Hendry County communities, Montura Ranch Estates and Pioneer Plantation in the town of Clewiston (pop. 6,460), were of particular concern. According to the 2000 census, nearly 20% of Clewiston residents lived below the poverty level (3). The assessment determined that approximately one third of households also had been affected by at least one other hurricane that preceded Wilma during 2004 and 2005. More than half of the households surveyed lived in homes that were damaged but still habitable, and 10% of households in Montura Ranch Estates reported their homes as uninhabitable; approximately 73% of households had not received information about how to remain safe during clean-up activities. Results of the assessment were immediately provided to the Hendry County Emergency Operations Center, Hendry County Health Department, and FDOH for allocation of resources to help these communities recover from the hurricane.
During November 1-2, teams from FDOH, CDC, NCDPH, and North Carolina Public Health Regional Surveillance Teams (PHRST) traveled to Clewiston, on Lake Okeechobee in southcentral Florida, to assess the needs of residents in the two communities 8 days after Hurricane Wilma. The local tax appraiser's office provided information regarding property parcels, which was used to obtain a sample population. Any parcel that did not contain at least one building structure was excluded from the survey. Samples of 166 of 1,222 parcels thought to have structures in Montura Ranch Estates and 140 of 345 parcels in Pioneer Plantation were randomly selected using statistical analysis software, and locations were mapped as described previously (4, 5) . Because more than 40% of Clewiston residents were Hispanic, bilingual teams were deployed, and all survey questions were asked in English or Spanish.
In Montura Ranch Estates, teams used handheld devices equipped with global positioning system technology to locate the selected parcels and personal digital assistants (PDAs) to record survey responses. In Pioneer Plantation, teams used paper maps of the area to locate selected parcels. Interviews were conducted using both paper and PDA versions of the questionnaire.
Interviewers in both areas made at least four attempts, at least 1 hour apart, to make contact with the selected households. In all cases, the reason for an unsuccessful interview attempt was recorded. When an interview could not be obtained at a selected address, teams proceeded to the next address on their list.
During November 1-2, teams approached the 166 parcels in Montura Ranch Estates and 140 parcels in Pioneer Plantation. Ninety-one interviews were completed in Montura Ranch Estates (overall response rate: 55%) and 74 in Pioneer Plantation (overall response rate: 53%), for a total of 165 households. In Montura Ranch Estates, 17 (10%) of the 166 parcels approached contained no identifiable housing structure. Thirty-seven (22%) contained a housing structure that was not occupied at the time of the interview attempt. Ten (6%) homes were inaccessible (e.g., because of flooding or debris), and nine (5%) were destroyed. Two (1%) of the parcels were occupied by households that declined to be interviewed. In Pioneer Plantation, 12 (9%) of the 140 parcels approached contained no identifiable housing structure, and 39 (28%) contained homes that were unoccupied. Eleven (8%) homes were inaccessible, and two (1%) were destroyed. Households at two (1%) parcels declined to be interviewed.
In both Hendry County communities, the average household size was three persons, both before and after Hurricane Wilma. In Montura Ranch Estates, 11 (12%) households had at least one occupant aged <2 years, and 32 (35%) had at least one occupant aged >65 years. In Pioneer Plantation, one household reported an occupant aged <2 years, and three (4%) households had at least one occupant aged >65 years.
In Montura Ranch Estates, 74 (81%) households lived in mobile homes, and 17 (19%) lived in single-family homes (Table) . Forty-seven (64%) Pioneer Plantation households lived in mobile homes and 26 (35%) in single-family homes. Thirty-five (38%) homes in Montura Ranch Estates and 34 (46%) homes in Pioneer Plantation had minimal or no damage. Eighty-six (52%) of the homes in both areas were considered damaged but habitable by the residents living there at the time of the interview. Nine (10%) homes in Montura Ranch Estates were considered to be uninhabitable, and one (1%) home in Pioneer Plantation was considered uninhabitable. Eighteen (20%) households in Montura Ranch Estates and 29 (39%) in Pioneer Plantation reported needing a tarpaulin to cover leaking roofs. At the time of the survey, more than 88% of households in both communities had basic utilities (i.e., running water, working toilet, and landline or cellular telephone service). Two (2%) households in Montura Ranch Estates and seven (9%) in Pioneer Plantation reported having a working carbon monoxide (CO) detector.
Eighty-two (90%) households in Montura Ranch Estates and 58 (80%) in Pioneer Plantation reported receiving disaster relief (e.g., food, water, ice, or shelter) in the 7 days before the interview. A total of 145 of 150 (97%) households in both communities reported having access to a 3-day supply of food, and 19 (13%) reported that at least one household member had been ill or sustained an injury since the hurricane. Six (4%) of 150 households reported that a household member had been unable to obtain needed medical care.
Forty-five (27%) households in the two communities reported having received information about safety (e.g., safe use of pressure cleaners to reduce the risk for CO poisoning during hurricane cleanup) during the week before the survey. Radio and television were the most common sources of this information. Other sources included word of mouth and flyers. Editorial Note: Rural areas present unique challenges to assessing and fulfilling the needs of residents after disasters such as hurricanes. Although they often sustain more damage than urban areas, needs of rural communities can be more difficult to assess because of lesser population density. Residents in certain rural areas are more socieoeconomically disadvantaged and often have more needs than their urban counterparts; available recovery resources can be quickly exhausted.
The survey results indicate that public health risk factors were present in Hendry County 8 days after Hurricane Wilma struck the area. Property damage was substantial, with more than half of the homes, although habitable, sustaining damage from the storm. The majority of residents had used disaster relief aid services, but only 27% reported receiving information on clean-up safety. Only 5% of survey participants had a working CO detector in their homes, although one third of households had been affected by at least one previous hurricane in [2004] [2005] .
The findings in this report are subject to at least three limitations. First, residents of evacuated or destroyed homes were unavailable for inclusion in the assessment, which likely underestimated overall needs. Second, homes that might have been occupied but were inaccessible because of flooding or debris also were not included in the assessment. Finally, lack of updated census information and maps to accurately define the communities being assessed might have resulted in sampling errors.
On November 3, recommendations based on the findings in this report were presented to FDOH and the Hendry County 
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Emergency Operations Center, which responded immediately. Recommendations included the following: 1) provide residents with information and assistance on post-storm home remediation (e.g., clean-up safety, debris removal, and CO poisoning risks), 2) restore electric power to households without it, 3) consider implementing a program to facilitate access to medical care and prescription drugs, 4) provide tarpaulins to residents with damaged roofs to temporarily prevent leaking, and 5) ensure that populations affected by the storm had knowledge of and access to food banks in their areas. 
Laboratory Surveillance
During April 2-8, World Health Organization (WHO) collaborating laboratories and National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance System (NREVSS) laboratories in the United States reported testing 1,908 specimens for influ-* Provisional data reported as of April 14. Additional information about influenza activity is updated each Friday and is available from CDC at http://www.cdc.gov/flu. † Levels of activity are 1) widespread: outbreaks of influenza or increases in influenzalike illness (ILI) cases and recent laboratory-confirmed influenza in at least half the regions of a state; 2) regional: outbreaks of influenza or increases in ILI cases and recent laboratory-confirmed influenza in at least two but less than half the regions of a state; 3) local: outbreaks of influenza or increases in ILI cases and recent laboratory-confirmed influenza in a single region of a state; 4) sporadic: small numbers of laboratory-confirmed influenza cases or a single influenza outbreak reported but no increase in cases of ILI; and 5) no activity. 
P&I Mortality and ILI Surveillance
During the week ending April 8, P&I accounted for 7.4% of all deaths reported through the 122 Cities Mortality Reporting System. This percentage is below the epidemic threshold † † of 8.0% (Figure 2 ).
The percentage of patient visits for ILI was 1.9%, which is below the national baseline of 2.2% ( Figure 3 ). The percentage of patient visits for ILI ranged from 1.2% in the West North Central region to 4.6% in the West South Central region. (56%) were fatal (Table) . This represents an increase of one case in Indonesia since the previous update on April 11. The majority of infections appear to have been acquired from direct contact with infected poultry. No evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission of H5N1 has been detected,
Pediatric Deaths and Hospitalizations

Notice to Readers
Africa Malaria Day -April 25, 2006
Approximately 90% of the estimated 1 million deaths caused by malaria each year occur in Africa, where every 30 seconds a child dies from malaria (1). To confront this public health problem, on April 25, 2000, government leaders from 44 African countries met in Abuja, Nigeria, and signed the Abuja Declaration, committing their countries to decreasing malaria deaths in Africa by 50% by 2010 (2). This event has been commemorated every year since on Africa Malaria Day.* This year's theme, Universal Access to Effective Malaria Treatment Is a Human Right, and the associated slogan, Get your ACT Together!, underscore the importance of ensuring access to artemisinin-based combination treatment (ACT). Because chloroquine is no longer effective in Africa and resistance is increasing to other first-line antimalarials, the World Health Organization has recommended a change to ACTs, and many African countries now recommend first-line use of ACT, a more expensive, but more effective drug regimen (3).
Africa Malaria Day also is an occasion to recognize renewed global commitment to the fight against malaria. On Africa Malaria Day in 2005, the World Bank pledged $500 million to $1 billion over the next 5 years to its Global Strategy and , an international nonprofit organization, partnered with Zambia to promote rapid scale-up of malaria interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. The Malaria Control and Evaluation Partnership in Africa, consisting of PATH, the Government of Zambia, and other local and global partners, is working to increase malaria prevention and control and assess the impact on morbidity and mortality of major interventions, including case management, personal protection with insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) and indoor residual spraying (IRS), and prevention of malaria during pregnancy. Before and during the recent transmission season, the Zambian government distributed approximately 500,000 ITNs and retreatment kits, extended IRS to eligible households in 15 districts, and extended ACT coverage to all district health facilities.
On Immunization is one of the most effective ways to protect infants and children from potentially serious diseases. Because of increased emphasis on vaccination, the majority of vaccine-preventable diseases have decreased in incidence by approximately 99% from peak prevaccine levels in the United States (1). In 2005, CDC announced the elimination of rubella virus in the United States (1). Measles is no longer endemic in the United States (1). The number of measles cases in the Western Hemisphere has been reduced by more than 99%, from approximately 250,000 cases in 1990 to 75 cases in 2005 (2) .
In 2005, a total of 62 cases of measles, one case of wild poliovirus, and no cases of diphtheria were reported in the United States (3) . Approximately 11,000 infants are born each day in the United States; according to the recommended childhood immunization schedule, they require approximately 24 doses of vaccine (18-19 injections using combination vaccines) before age 2 years to protect them from 13 vaccinepreventable diseases (4) .
Arizona, Utah, and communities along the United StatesMexico border will host kick-off events highlighting the need to achieve and maintain high childhood vaccination coverage rates, including provider education activities, media events, and immunization clinics in collaboration with CDC, state and local health departments, the United States-Mexico Border Health Commission, and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO).
NIIW is being held in conjunction with VWA. VWA, sponsored by PAHO, targets children and other vulnerable and underserved populations with low vaccination coverage rates in all countries in the Western Hemisphere during this annual campaign.
During NIIW-VWA, CDC will introduce a new Spanishlanguage public education campaign, including television and radio public service announcements, posters, and print advertisements. Additional information about NIIW-VWA and childhood vaccination is available from CDC's National Immunization Program at http://www.cdc.gov/nip/events/niiw/ default.htm. Information on VWA is available at http://www. paho.org/English/DD/PIN/vw_2006.htm. † Calculated by summing the incidence counts for the current week, the two weeks preceding the current week, and the two weeks following the current week, for a total of 5 preceding years. Additional information is available at http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/phs/files/5yearweeklyaverage.pdf. § Not notifiable in all states. ¶ Includes both neuroinvasive and non-neuroinvasive. Updated weekly from reports to the Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases, National Center for Infectious Diseases (ArboNET Surveillance). ** Data for H. influenzae (all ages, all serotypes) are available in Table II . † † Updated monthly from reports to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention. Implementation of HIV reporting influences the number of cases reported. Data for HIV/AIDS are available in Table IV 3  28  71  244  389  68  108  285  1,349  1,403  3  3  12  37  49  Connecticut  -0  37  46  100  -40  238  379  344  -0  8  8  17  Maine  -3  11  16  41  1  2  6  39  40  -0  1  4  2  Massachusetts  3  12  34  124  169  50  48  76  709  816  2  1  5  19  20  New Hampshire  -0  7  8  13  3  4  9  65  38  -0  3  2  -Rhode Island  -0  25  13  21  11  8  25  139  153  -0  5  1  6  Vermont†   -3  9 -3  20  32  56  Alaska  -2  6  8  18  9  10  23  156  146  -0  19  3  2  California  34  39  87  519  543  229  645  804  8,775  9,430  -0  8  3  14  Hawaii  -1  6  13  22  -19  36  251  281  -0  2  4  3  Oregon†   -8  21  97  82  19  28  58  316  466  -2  8  21  37  Washington  3  6  88  56  49  44  72  142  1,177  1,012  -0  4 1 - Rico  -3  14  3  39  3  6  16  97  118  -0 
New England
W.S. Central  -1  7  1  18  -1  30  10  32  Arkansas  -0  2  ---0  2  -2  Louisiana  -0  1  -2  -0  1  -1  Oklahoma  -0  0  ---0  6  1  2  Texas†   -0  7  1  16  -1  29  9 27 -3  19  66  15  1  4  12  52  62  Alaska  -0  1  -1  -0  1  4  2  California  -2  19  66  12  1  3  10  37  51  Hawaii  N  0  0  N  N  -0  4  -4  Oregon†   -0  3  -2  -0  2  4  2  Washington  -0  3  ---0  5  7  3 American Samoa † Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS). 20  21  83  388  469  16  13  58  264  263  108  429  2,423  3,222  5,680 New England  -1  5  17  29  -1  3  17  10  2  28  55  332  357  Connecticut  -0  2  3  8  -0  2  3  2  -0  3  -23  Maine  -0  1  2  1  -0  1  2  1  -1  5  15  15  Massachusetts  -0  3  10  13  -0  3  10  3  -22  44  274  273  New Hampshire  -0  2  2  3  -0  2  2  3  2  2  15  18  -Rhode Island  -0  1  -2  -0  0  ---0 4  4  14  73  73  2  2  7  30  32  23  23  90  292  406  Delaware  -0  1  2  2  -0  1  2  2  -0  1  1  11  District of Columbia  -0  0  ---0  0  ---0  3  3  -Florida  3  1  6  29  30  2  0  5  11  12  -4  14  70  46  Georgia  -0  2  6  8  -0  2  6  8  -1  3  6  12  Maryland 0  1  3  2  -2  10  22  42  Oregon†   -2  8  30  44  -1  6  21  24  -4  33  46  260  Washington  1  0  25  18  18  1  0  11  8  8  2  10  189  80 118 19  35  57  466  713  8  17  94  269  113  91  257  507  1,834  1,824  Delaware  -0  0  ---0  2  2  1  -2  9  13  15  District of Columbia  -0  0  ---0  1  ---1  7  19  13  Florida  -0  16  47  201  1  0  3  7  7  61  99  230  819  722  Georgia  -4  27  43  80  -1  9  15  7  4  34  70  280  257  Maryland †   -0  1  ---0  1  ---8  25  80  90  Washington  U  0  0  U  U  N  0  0  N  N  15  8  121  89  85 American Samoa -0  0  ---1  4  12  17  -3  27  159  96  Utah  -0  6  16  22  -0  2  1  3  27  8  55  335  227  Wyoming  2  0  3  17  14  -0  0  ---0  3  9 New England  -0  3  ---0  2  --Connecticut  -0  2  ---0  1  --Maine  -0  0  ---0  0  --Massachusetts  -0  3  ---0 -0  3 2  ---0  2 2  -2  Arkansas  -0  3  ---0  2  --Louisiana  -0  20  ---0  9  -2  Oklahoma  -0  6  ---0  3  --Texas§   -0  1 6  ---0  1 
Pacific
U 0 0 U U U 0 0 U U C.N.M.I. U 0 0 U U U 0 0 U U Guam - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - Puerto Rico N 0 0 N N - 0 1 - - U.S. Virgin Islands - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - C.N.
United States
S. Atlantic
American Samoa U 0 1 - - U 0 1 U U U 0 0 U U C.N.M.I. U 0 0 - - U 0 0 U U U 0 0 U U Guam - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - Puerto Rico - 0 1 2 4 - 0 1 2 4 - 0 2 - 2 U.S. Virgin Islands - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - C.N.
U 0 0 U U U 0 0 U U U 0 2 U 1 C.N.M.I. U 0 0 U U U 0 0 U U U 0 0 U U Guam - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - 1N 0 0 N N American Samoa U 0 0 U U U 0 2 U 2 U 0 0 U U C.N.M.I. U 0 0 U U U 0 0 U U U 0 0 U U Guam - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - 1 - 0 0 - - Puerto Rico - 0 1 - 1 - 0 1 1 - N 0 0 N N U.S. Virgin Islands - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - C.N.
W.S. Central
